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ABSTRACT
Overseas production in a country by affiliates of Swedish and U.S. firms
rarely appears to displace exports from the two home countries and in most
cases either has no effect or tends to increase home country exports. The
positive effect on Swedish exports is evident not only with respect to levels
of exports to different countries at one time but also with respect to changes
in exports over time. The positive effect on U.S. exports can be observed for
minority—owned as well as majority-owned foreign operations.
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The effect of foreign production by a country's firms on the home
country's exports continues to be a puzzle after many years of controversy and
a considerable amount of empirical research. Theoretical models of direct
foreign investment typically treat the size of a market as exogenous and
a company's share of a market as a function of its firm-specific capital. The
decision as to whether to produce abroad is then a matter of choosing among
possible methods of serving the foreign market, including exporting from the
home country, producing abroad, and Ucensing others to produce the firm's
product. That decision will depend on the nature of the firm's intangible
assets, on transport costs, economies or diseconomies of scale, barriers to
trade and other government regulations, on factor prices at home and in other
countries, as well as on the need to adapt the product to differences among
markets in the characteristics demanded. This more or less standard view of
the multinational firm implies that production in a market is a substitute for
production at home for export to that market.
A more neutral viewpoint would be to regard a firm's share of a market as
being at least partly dependent on whether it produces there, even though
local production does not affect the demand for the firm's products. That
would be the case, for example, if a product were totally non-tradable: that
may be true for some services, such as tourism or medical care. If all the
firm's products were nontradable, there could, of course, be no effect of
overseas production on exports. A more interesting example would be that of a—2—
firm that can increase its market share in a country by producing there,
because local production reduces the cost of supplying the market. If that
local production requires some input from the parent, such as components, it
might raise or lower parent exports, depending on the size of the gain in
market share and the importance of parent input in the affiliate's output.
A third possibility is that foreign production increases host-country
demand for the firm's products. In that case, higher foreign production would
be more likely to lead to larger home-country exports. That is most easily
seen if the foreign production is in trade and services ancillary to
exporting, such as sales and service operations. It could also be the case for
foreign production of one part of a parent company's range of products that
familiarizes a market with the parent company's name and reputation. It would
also be possible for foreign production to raise the demand for the product in
general, rather than only the output of the producing firm. That might be
the case, for example, if a company like Coca Cola enters a country and
advertises heavily. The demand for cola drinks might increase enough to
open the market to local or other foreign producers.
With all these possibilities, the assumption of fixed market shares
for a parent firm, convenient though it is, seems inappropriate to us.
Furthermore, even if a firm's overseas production added to exports by the
parent, for one of the reasons mentioned above, that addition might be at
the expense of exports by rival companies in the home country. For this
reason we examine the effects of foreign production on a home country's
exports rather than on the exports of the parents themselves.
We analyze the effects of foreign production on home country exports,—3-
using cross-section data from Sweden and the United States. In addition,
for Swedish exports, we also study the determinants of changes over time in
exports to each destination.
Earlier jjJl Findig
Despite the implications of theoretical models of direct investment,
empirical studies have rarely observed substitution between overseas produc-
tion and exports. A cross-section study for 1970 covering 14 industries,
based on foreign production data for about 200 of the larger U.S.
investors, found only positive coefficients among those that were signifi-
cant in equations in which U.S. exports to a country in an industry were
related to U.S. companies' production in that country and industry as well
as to other variables (Lipsey and Weiss, 1981). At the same time, coef-
ficients for U.S. companies' production were mostly negative in equations
explaining exports to each country by other industrial countries. There was
weaker evidence, from data on numbers of affiliates, that investment by
countries other than the U.S. was negatively related to US, exports, and
positively related to exports by other countries. The positive
(complementary) relationship between U.S.-owned production and U.S. exports
was also evident in equations for individual U.S. firms' exports, based on
the same data (Lipsey and Weiss, 1984).
Bergsten, Horst, and Moran (1978), using published IRS and U.S.
Department of Commerce data, concluded that "...therelation between foreign
investment and exports or imports is largely haphazard," (p. 97), although
they suggested that there is a noticeable complementarity for investment up to
a certain level, because most of the initial investment goes into marketing-4-
and assembly.
The most elaborate examination of trade—investment relationships for
individual firms has been performed by Swedenborg (1979) and (1982) for
Swedish multinationals. OLS equations relating the ratio of exports to home
production to the ratio of foreign to home production across all industries
showed a positive and significant influence of foreign production on firm
exports, and of foreign production in a country on firm exports to the
country. A 2SLS estimate of the relationship found it not to be statist-i--
cally significant, although the coefficients across all firms, and across
all firms and countries, did not change greatly. As compared with those in
the OLS equations, they fell by 25 to 30 per cent. Equations confined to
firms with more than five affiliates produced lower coefficients in OLS
equations, and more of a decline in 2SLS.
Swedenborg (1982) also combined data from four Swedish surveys, again
using 2SLS and found that each increase of foreign production in a country by
$10 produced an increase of exports to that country by the parent company of
$1. That one dollar increase was the net outcome of $1.20 added to exports to
the affiliate and .20 subtracted from exports to non—affiliates in the
country.
EjJje Effects of ForeignProduction
Thefear that foreign production by a country's firms means the export of
jobs to other countries is an old one. Bergsten, Horst, and Moran (1978)
trace the discussion in the U.S. back to the 1920's, despite the fact that
much of the flow of U.S. investment at that time was in public utilities,
not likely to be competitive with U.S. production.—5-
While the idea of exporting jobs in the aggregate is a fuzzy one, and
while economists have not generally considered the maximization of commodity
exports to be a sensible objective for economic policy, these fears have
led to recurrent efforts to measure the effect that U.S. firms overseas
production has on exports and to proposals for government action to hinder
the growth of such production.
There are several possible ways of defining what is meant by the proposi-
tion that production overseas by a country's firms substitutes for, or is
complementary to, exports by the country or by the parent firms themselves.
Each of them is associated with a different implied model of the behavior
of firms or a different policy question.
The simplest, if unrealistic, view might be that the factors determining
the location and extent of affiliate production in a country are unrelated to
the factors that determine parent exports to a country. This would be the case
if affiliates were handed out to parents in a lottery. What might amount to
much the same thing would be if the decision to establish an affiliate in a
country were a very long-term one, and virtually permanent once made, while
the export decision was a short-term one, easily adjusted to contemporary cir-
cumstances. Then, even if the existence and size of an affiliate reflected
the same influences, such as exchange rates or price levels, that also played
an important role in determining trade flows, the investment and the exports
would reflect these influences from different periods. In that case, we could
still interpret a coefficient for affiliate production, for example, in an
equation explaining exports from the home country as representing the effect
of affiliate production on exports.-6-
The persistent problem in these analyses is the likelihood that the
variables that determine investment in a country and affiliate production are
the same as the ones determining trade flows. Some of the obvious ones, such
as host country income and income per capita, can be included in the equation
for trade flows to avoid attributing their effect to affiliate activity.
However, the risk that always remains is that there are unaccounted-for
variables--such as host country regulation--that influence both investment and
trade, and that we attribute their effects to investment.
There have been various attempts to escape this problem. The most obvious
way is to include all relevant explanatory variables in the trade equation,
but one can never be sure that there are not important additional variables
omitted. In studies of exports by Swedish multinationals, Swedenborg (1979
and 1982) used 2SLS, with the first stage equation estimating affiliate pro-
duction and the second stage parent exports as a whole and parent exports to
individual countries. The results were not very different quantitatively from
the OLS results, but one difficulty was the fact that the first stage equation
explained little of the variation in affiliate production. Consequently, a
good deal of what may have been relevant variation in affiliate production was
omitted in the second stage.
Lipsey and Weiss (1981 and 1984) attempted to escape the problem by
including a larger number of variables in the OLS equations, by working within
fairly detailed industries, and by examining the relationships of affiliate
production, not only to home-country exports, but also to exports by others.
The idea behind the last procedure was that it was likely to reveal some
spurious relationships based on omitted characteristics of countries, providedthat they did not produce opposite effects on U.S.exports and exports by
others.
Another method of dealing with the simultaneity issue, whichwe have tried
in this paper, is to study changes over time in home-countryexports to each
destination, rather than the levels of exports. The assumption involved is
that the effects of the most troublesome unaccounted-for factors thatsimulta-
neously influence investment and exports do not determine changes in these,or
that their influence is incorporated in the initial levels of affiliatepro-
duction and exports, We do not believe that such a cross-section ofchanges
over time has been tried before.
Ie_q ions
The equations explaining U.S. and Swedish exports for eachindustry
group are related to the trade equations of the type discussed in Learner
and Stern (1970) and used in studies by Chenery (1960), Linnernan(1966),
and others. However, they do differ in a couple ofrespects. One is that
they all relate to exports from one country and therefore do not involve
any exporting country variables. A second is that we use GOP and GOP per
capita rather than GOP and population (only two of the three, income,popu-
lation, and income per capita can be used, because any two determine the
third). A third difference is that we have dropped the distance variable,
typically used as a measure of trade resistance, since it made little dif-
ference to the results and we needed to economize on independent variables.
The implied trade equation for each industry is then:
EXP =f(GDP1GDPCJ)-8-
where
EXP.j =Exportsfrom the U.S. or Sweden to country j in products of
industry i in 1982
GDPJ
=RealGDP of country j in 1982 in international prices
(see Appendix)
GDPCJ =RealGOP per capita of country j in 1982 in international
prices
We expect the coefficients for GDP to be positive, although one can
imagine cases in which the expected influence of aggregate income on the
aggregate demand for the product is more than offset by its influence on
supply. That may be the case, for example, in an industry in which econo-
mies of scale are of great importance and large markets are the preferred
locations for production, so that while overall demand in a country is
high, import demand is low. Coefficients for GDPC may be either positive
or negative and can be influenced by both demand-side and supply-side fac-
tors. Among the demand—side influences, a high income elasticity of demand
should mean high demand in countries with high per capita income, given
the aggregate GOP, and therefore a positive coefficient for GDPC. A low
income elasticity should produce a negative coefficient. Among supply-side
influences, if, for example, high income per capita were associated with
high skill levels arid, therefore, comparative advantage in skill-intensive
products, import demand should be low and the coefficient negative.
Obvious missing variables are tariff levels, for which we do not have-9-
information for a sufficient number of countries, and restrictions on
imports or inducements to exports by affiliates, which are possibilities
for further research. There are no industry characteristics, such as appear
in some other studies of this issue, because each equation includes data
for only one industry group.
To these trade equations we add several variables representing affi-
liate activity or production. These are:
NS1J Net Saie of affiliates -in industry i located in country j
(Sales minus -:s r'om the home country).
NLS =NetLocal Sales: Sales of affiliates -in industry I located
in country j minus the portion of these sales accounted for
by imports. That amount is estimated assuming that the
ratio of imports to sales is the same for sales in the
host country as for sales to other countries.
NES1j =NetExport Sales: Sales of affiliates in industry i located
in country j to buyers outside country j, minus the portion
of these sales accounted for by imports, estimated as for
NLS.
We have no prior expectations for either Net Sales or Net Local Sales.
They include a mixture of influences in opposite directions. To the extent
that affiliate production substitutes for exports from the United States or
Sweden by either the parents or other firms, the effect on exports should
be negative. That would be true if affiliate production of finished pro-- 10—
ductssubstituted for exports of finished products, but also even if affi-
liate assembly of products substituted for only the final stages of output,
provided that the U.S. or Swedish companies' share in the country's con-
sumption was a fixed amount determined by country size and other country
variables. Even if production in a host country increased exports of com-
ponents or of other finished products by the parent, the effect on home
country exports as a whole could be negative if some production replaced
export sales by other U.S. or Swedish companies.
On the other side, if production in a host country by a U.S. or
Swedish company increased the size of that country's market for the pro-
ducts of that company's industry, or if it raised the company's share of
the market even without increasing the size of the market, the effect on
home-country exports would be positive, provided that the increase in share
came at the expense of local or other foreign companies rather than of U.S.
or Swedish companies. The positive effects could be on home-country
exports of raw materials or components or on home-country exports of other
finished products as local production familiarized the host country with
the parent's brand name or with U.S. or Swedish goods more generally. The
positive effect on home-country exports may be enhanced by the fact that
some of the affiliate production, even in affiliates classified as manufac-
turing, consists of distribution and service activities.
As between Net Sales and Net Local Sales, we would expect negative coef-
ficients to be more likely in the latter case. To the extent that affiliate
production is for export rather than for local sale, it should not substitute
for home-country exports to the host country, even if it competes with home-— 11—
countryexports to other countries. Thus, we treat the production for export
separately and expect the coefficient on Net Export Sales to be positive.
Effects of Swedish Affiliate Production
Our examination of the consequences of Swedish firms' overseas production
is based on the same set of data on individual multinational firms as was used
by Swedenborg (1982). However, it focuses on aggregate Swedish exports in each
industry, including exports by non-multinational firms, rather than on exports
by the parent firms themselves. The data cover 10 individual industries
(see Appendix for a description of the data). We have used equations for
only the 7 industries in which there are at least 10 countries with
Swedish—owned production.
The impact on Swedish exports of overseas production by Swedish firms
is described by the set of coefficients for affiliate production in
equations explaining Swedish exports to a country by GDP and GDP per
capita, as in the trade equations described above, but adding a variable
for being a Nordic country (Denmark, Finland, and Norway). We also per-
formed a 2SLS regression on the Swedish data where the first stage
equations included a dummy variable for EEC membership. We expect the coef-
ficients for GOP and GOP per capita as well as that for being a Nordic
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in a Country in Equations Explaining Swedish
























bEquations include, as independent variables, GDP. GDPCj, a dummy variable
for being a Nordic country, and Swedish manufacturing aFfiliate net sales.
The instrument variable in the 2SLS is a variable for EEC membership.
Source: Appendix Tables S-i and S-2
In the OLS regressions, all the coefficients are positive, implying
that, other things equal, greater production by Swedish affiliates in a
country is associated with larger exports from Sweden. The range of coef-
ficients is wide, from 230 Kroner of exports per thousand Kroner of produc-
tion -inthehost country, to exports greater than the host-country
production. There is no evidence here that host-country production substi-— 13—
tutesfor exports from Sweden.
There is some suggestion in the results of unaccounted for curvilinearity
in the relationship, in the fact that the intercepts, supposedly showing the
exports that would take place without any Swedish-owned production in the
country, are mostly negative and fairly large, although they are not statisti-
cally significant (see Appendix Table S-i).
The coefficients in the 2SLS regressions are in general much larger than
those in the OLS equations, although the story they tell is similar. All the
coefficients in the 2SLS analysis are positive, and two of them indicate
that a Kronor of Swedish-owned production in a foreign country draws in
more than a Kronor of Swedish exports.
We were able to distinguish affiliate production for local sale in the
host country (Net Local Sales) for only five industries. The result of
substituting net local sales for net sales in these five industries is
shown in Table 2.- 14—
Table2
Coefficients8 for Swedish Affiliate Net Sales and Net
Local Sales in a Country in Equations Explaining
Swedish Exports to the Country, 1978





Metal Mfg. .330 .268
(1.59) (.80)
Non-Elect. Machinery .336 .508
(5.87) (6.32)
Electrical Machinery .083 .085
(1.11) (1.12)
at_statistics in parentheses
Source: Appendix Table S-3
The substitution produces larger coefficients for affiliate sales in most
cases but only two of the differences are substantial.
On the whole, then, while we would hesitate to place great weight on the
estimated size of the coefficients, we think the evidence for a positive rela-
tionship is reasonably strong. There is certainly no sign of any negative
relationship 'in this cross-section.
Another way of looking at the relation between foreign production and
exports is to relate changes in exports to a country in each industry group
over a period to the initial levels of exports to and affiliate activity in
that country and to changes in real income and affiliate activity. We esti-




EXPij f(GDP, EXP70. NSiJ)
where
EXP.j
= Changesin exports from Sweden to country j in products of
industry i, 1970—1978 (thousand Kroner)
GDPJ
= Changesin real GDP of country j, 1970-1978 (million dollar)
EXP7OiJ
= Exportsfrom Sweden to country j -in products of industry I
in 1970 (thousand Kroner)
= Changesin Affiliates' Net Sales, 1970 -1978(thousand
Kroner)
NS70J
=AffiliatesNet Sales in 1970 (thousand Kroner)
The variable for exports -in the beginning of the period should incorporate
the effects of not only the factors that we controlled for in cross-section
equations above, but also most of the unaccounted-for variables that we
mentioned.
Initial foreign production and changes in -itareincluded in separate
regressions. The variable for the initial production position should tell
us whether affiliates substitute, in absolute terms, their own production
for imports from the home country as time goes by. In other words, do
Swedish exports increase less, given their initial level, to countries with
higher initial levels of Swedish-owned production. We should note that
this -is a different question from the one studied by Swedenborg (1979,
1982) which is whether the proportion of local sales that a company makes
made from local production changes with the age of the affiliate. The
short- or medium-run effects of foreign production on exports should be- 16-
reflectedin the coefficients for changes in affiliate production. In
other words, do Swedish exports increase less, given their initial level,
to countries where Swedish-owned production increases more.
The results from these regressions are as shown in Table 3.
Table 3
Coefficientsa for Swedish Affiliate Net Sales in a Country
in 1970 and Changes in Net Sales, 1970—78, in Equations
Explaining Changes in Swedish Exports to the Country 1970_78b
NS7O ANS




Metal Mfg. -.271 —.158
(2.60 (3.19)
Non—Elect. Machinery .122 .062
(2.27) (1.81)
Electrical Machinery .282 —.132
(1.04) (1.46)
Transport Equipment 1.899 .276
(2.71) (3.64)
Other Mfg. .836 .444
(2.44) (4.65)
at_statistics in parentheses
bBoth types of equations include, as independent variables, also Swedish
exports to a country in 1970, in thousands of Swedish Kroner, and the percen-
tage change in real GDP between 1970 and 1978.
Source: Appendix Table S-4
These results strengthen our earlier impressions of a predominantly
positive influence of affiliate production on exports. The variable for— 17—
theinitial level of affiliate production generally carries a positive and
strongly significant coefficient. Metal manufacturing is the main excep-
t-ion. There is thus not much evidence here that Swedish affiliates tend to
reduce their imports from Sweden over time. The higher the level of
Swedish—owned production -in 1970, the larger the increase in Swedish
exports between 1970 and 1978. The coefficient for changes in affiliate
production is positive in five of the seven industries, and significantly
different from zero at the 5 per cent level in three of these. Only in
metal manufacturing do we again find a negative and significant coef-
ficient. On the whole, the larger the growth in Swedish-owned producton
in the host country, the greater the growth in exports from Sweden. This
suggests a dominance of complementarity rather than of substitution between
overseas production and exports.
Effects of_U.S. Affiliate Production
For the United States we show two sets of equations and results. One
set of equations, using net sales as the measure of affiliate production,
as was done for Swedish affiliates, was available at a much more detailed
industry level than the Swedish data: 34 industries, of which we show
results for the 28 industries in which we had at least 15 countries with
some affiliate net sales. The second set of equations, in which we experi-
ment with other measures of affiliate production, was available only for
seven broad industry groups.
The coefficients for affiliate net sales in U.S. export equations are
summarized in Table 4.- 18-
Table4
Coefficients for Affiliate Net Sales in Equations







Coefficientswith t <1 12
Source: Appendix Table US1
In most of the industries, there is no statistically significant relation
between U.S. exports to a country and U.S. affiliate production there.
Where that association is significant, two thirds of the coefficients are
positive, suggesting complementarity between U.S. exports and U.S.-owned
production in a country, rather than substitution of one for the other.





Lumber, Wood, Furniture, and Fixtures
The negative coefficient for Drugs is surprising because it contradicts the
strong finding of complementarity for this industry in Lipsey and Weiss
(1981).
For broad groups of manufacturing industries we can make two further- 19-
setsof calculations. One is to separate affiliate net sales into produc-
tion for sale within the affiliates' host country and production for
export, and a second is to introduce some measures, necessarily crude, of
production by minority-owned U.S. affiliates.
As mentioned earlier, we would expect negative coefficients in U.S.
export equations to be more likely for net local sales than for net sales.
That expectation is confirmed in Table 5 for the four industry groups for
which we can make the calculation.
Table 5
Coefficientsa for U.S. Affiliate Net Sales,
Net Local Sales, and Net Export Sales in a Countryb







































Cincluding, as independent variables, GDP. GDPC. and measures of aff i—
hate activity
Source: Appendix Table US-2- 20-
Thesubstitution of net local sales for aggregate sales increases the size
of all the coefficients, including the negative coefficient for chemicals.
And the addition of the net export sales variable produces two negative
coefficients, one of which is significant. The net export sales coef-
ficients are predominantly positive, as we would expect. Thus to the
extent that there is any substitution of affiliate production for exports,
it is the production for local sale that is involved. Affiliate production
for export from the host country tends to raise U.S. exports to the host
country.
j2p_,jjporityQwned_Affiliates
Most analyses of trade-investment relationships have concentrated on
majority-owned affiliates. The main reason is probably the paucity of data on
affiliates that are 50 per cent or less owned by the parent. The Swedish
data used above include virtually no information on these affiliates, and
the U.S. surveys have exempted them from large parts of the questionnaire,
and particularly from the trade questions. One justification for that
exemption is that the parent firms often would not know the answers and
would not have the same ability to compel cooperation as in the case of
majority-owned affiliates.
The omission of affiliates 50 per cent or less owned would be relati-
vely harmless if they were randomly scattered over the world and over
industries. We know, however, thatthey are not. They are virtually the
onlyu.s. Japan, for example, and are of considerable impor-
tance in that country. Their importance is also associated with industry
and country characteristics, such as the technological level of the— 21—
industryand the income level of the country, both characteristics often
used in the examination of trade-investment relationships.
Aside from its interaction with some of the explanatory variables,pro-
duction by minority-owned affiliates (for convenience, we will referto
minority ownership, even though it includes a substantial number of cases of
50 per cent Ownership) might have different effects on trade from those of
production by majority-owned ownership. One possibility would be that the
effects would be simply a diluted version of those associated withmajority
ownership, because they are shared among several owners, some of which are
often not U.S. firms. On the other hand, production by minority-owned aff i-
hates might have a stronger effect on parent trade because minorityownership
is resorted to in cases in which the parent would otherwise be barred froma
market, either because the host country has particularly stringent barriers to
imports, or because the parent company does not have a very large tech-
nological advantage over other firms. Minority ownership might represent a
price for entry into a market more often than does majority ownership.
Because minority-owned affiliates did not receive the questionnaire on
the disposition of their sales, we cannot calculate net local sales or net
export sales for them. The activity measure for them in the following
equations is net sales, whatever the measure used for majority-owned aff i-
hates. We are also limited here to equations for four industrygroups instead
of the 28 industries used earlier because these equations are basedon
published data.
The coefficients for majority—owned and minority-owned affiliatepro-
duction, both measured by net sales, are shown in Table 6. All the coef-— 22-
ficientsfor sales of minority—owned affiliates are positive, as they are
also in the equations in which net local sales are the production measure.
The only significant negative coefficient is for production by majority—
owned affiliates in food industries, as in some cases discussed earlier. On
the whole, the addition of data for minority-owned affiliates strengthens
the case for a positive effect of affiliates' production on home-country
exports.
Table 6
Coefficientsa for Net Sales of Majority—Owned and
Minority-Owned Affiliates in a Countryb in EquationsC
Explaining U.S. Exports to that Country
Majority-Owned Minority-Owned







Non-Elect. Machinery 289 547
(3.0) (1.4)
Electrical Machinery 142 320
(1.4) (1.4)
Tranport Equipment 50 44
(3.0) (1.9)
at_statistics in parentheses Clncluding, as independent variables,
bExclud-jng Canada GDPj, GDPC and measures of affiliate
proauct ion
Source: Appendix Table US-3
8ecause many observations were missing, we could use the separate measures
for net local sales and net export sales of majority-owned affiliates in only— 23—
fourof the industry groups. This is shown in Table 7. The positive relation
of minority-owned affiliate production to exports is again evident. For
majority-owned affiliates, there is a predominantly positive relation of
total production to U.S. exports. However, in two of the industries, U.S.
firms' production for sale in the host country is negatively related to
exports to that country. That negative effect, not observed within more
disaggregated industries in the earlier calculations, is offset by the
expected positive relation of U.S. exports to production f or
export from the country. Thus, there is some hint that a degree of substi-
tution may take place in countries where U.S. firms' production ison a
large enough scale to provide for export sales as well as domestic sales.
The high coefficients on net export sales also suggest that affiliatepro-
duction in one country may be substituting to some extent for U.S.exports
to other countries.- 24-
Table7
Coefficientsa for Affiliate Production in a Country
in Eguationsb Explaining U.S. Exports to the Country
Production Measured by
Majority-Owned AffiliatesMinority Owned Affiliates
Net LocalNet Export Net Sales
Industry group Sales Sales *______
Chemicals —124 127 337
(3.1) (2.9) (5.5)
Non-Electrical 85 441 587
(.3) (2.0) (1.3)
Electrical Machinery —595 1,289 606
(3.2) (4.8) (3.6)
Transport Equipment 59 16 23
(2.4) (.6) (1.1)
at_statistics in parentheses bIncud.jng as independent variables,
CExclud.jng Canada GDP, GDPCJS and measures of affiliate
proäuct ion.
Source: Appendix Table US-3
A check on the results for U.S. exports is to run parallel sets of
equations in which the dependent variable is exports by other countries to
the same destinations. If U.S.-owned production serves to increase U.S.
shares in a country's imports, without expanding the level of imports,
U.S.-owned production should be negatively related to exports by other
countries to the host countries. If U.S.-owned production increases U.S.
sales by expanding markets in host countries, we might find no relation to
exports by other countries or even a positive one. A positive relationship
could also reflect an expansion of a company's exports to the host country
from its other operations outside the U.S. A more troublesome implication— 25—
ofa positive coefficient would be that -itshowsthat we have not success-
fully accounted for important determinants of a host-country's imports.
The coefficients in equations for 28 industries using net sales as the
affiliate production measure, shown in Appendix Table US-4, are all posi-
tive and all but a few are statistically significant. Among the possible
interpretations we lean toward the likelihood that some important factor
explaining trade may have been omitted from the equations for U.S. exports.
We can include minority affiliate activity and the division of sales
between local and export for only four industries. While the number of
cases is too small to be conclusive, if we introduce production by U.S.
minority-owned affiliates into the equations, as we can do for the broad
industry groups, we find (Table 8) that the positive relation between
U.S.-owned production and sales by other countries remains. However, produc-
tion by minority-owned U.S. firms does appear to substitute for a country's
imports from countries other than the U.S.— 26—
Table8
Coefficientsa for Production by Majority-Owned and
Minority-Owned U.S. Affiliates in a Countryb in
Equationsc Explaining Exports to a Country by
Countries other than the U.S.
______ Productionof








Non—Elect. Machinery 593 1,152
(2.0) (0.9)
Electrical Machinery 2,043 -158
(6.7) (.2)
Transport Equipment 512 -641
(2.9) (2.7)
at_statistics in parentheses clncluding, as independent variables,
GOP GDPC. and measures of affiliate
bExciuding Canada production
Source: Appendix Table US-5
Some further hint of what we may be missing by omitting minority affi-
hates from our earlier calculations can again be gleaned from the
equations in Table 9. These separate affiliate production for local sale
from production for export and include minority affiliate net sales. The
large positive coefficients in the equations for exports by other countries
are associated mainly with U.S. affiliates' production for export. We would






at..statistics in parentheses blnciuding, as independent variables,
GDP, GDPC and measures of affiliate
CExciuding Canada production
Source: Appendix Table US-5
There is a preponderance of positive coefficients for minority-owned
U.S. affiliate production in U.S. export equations, and of negative coef-
ficients in equations for exports by others to a market. That suggests that
minority-owned production, even more than production by majority-owned aff i-
hates, is a way in which U.S. firms buy entry into a market or market share
for themselves, and hinder it for their foreign rivals.
— 27—
tionlocation. Production by U.S. minority-owned affiliates in two
industries, and production for local sale by majority-owned affiliates in
one industry, do appear to substitute for imports from countries other than
the U.S.
Table 9
Coefficientsa for U.S. Affiliate Local and Export Sales
in Equationsb Explaining Exports to a Countryc by
Countries other than the U.S.
Majority-Owned Affiliates linority—0jf_fj hates






Elect. Machinery 1,212 3,408 -1
(1.4) (2.7) (.0)
Transport Equipment 586 15
(7.0) (.2)- 28-
Conclusions
The predominant relationship between production in a country by affiliates
of Swedish and U.S. firms and exports to that country from Sweden and the U.S.
is something between no effect on home-country exports at all and inducing a
higher level of home-country exports.
The higher the level of Swedish affiliate production in a country, the
higher the level of Swedish exports to that country in that industry. This rela-
tionship in OLS equations is confirmed in a 2SLS analysis that attempts to
remove the effects of the simultaneous determination of Swedish exports and
host-country affiliate production by Swedish firms and is observed whether pro-
duction is measured by affiliate net sales or by net local sales. The same
conclusions are produced by an analysis of changes over time in Swedish exports.
Both high initial levels of Swedish affiliate production in a country and
increases in production are positively associated with increases in Swedish
exports to the country.
The results for the U.S. are more mixed. At the most disaggregated industry
level there is a predominance of positive relationships between affiliate net
sales and U.S. exports, but there are a few negative coefficients implying some
substitution of affiliate production for exports from the U.S. Data for broad
industry groups give some indication that part of the positive influence of
affiliate production on exports from the U.S. is the effect of affiliate produc-
tion for export from the host country. Minority—owned affiliates of U.S. firms
were somewhat more likely to be a means of buying market shares for the U.S. and
denying them to others than were majority—owned affiliates.- 29-
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Data
The U.S. affiliate production data are from the individual firm reports
underlying U.S. Department of Commerce (1985), a presumably quite complete
census of U.S. direct investment abroad in 1982. Since these reports are con-
fidential, the calculations described here were carried out for us within the
Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
The Swedish data for production of individual foreign affiliates come
from the Industriens Utredningsinstitut (IUI) of Stockholm. The IUI has
completed four surveys of Swedish multinationals foreign investment abroad
covering 1965, 1970, 1974, and 1978. These surveys cover virtually all Swedish
firms investing abroad and are in general comparable to the BEA surveys (see
Swedenborg, 1979 and 1982).
Exports by the U.S. and all market economies to different countries, by
the industry classifications used in the U.S. direct investment survey, were
taken from United Nations trade tapes and converted from the SITC to this
industry classification. Swedish exports by industry are from Statistiska
S
Centralbyran(Utdrag ur Makrobasen).- 31—
AppendixTable S—i













































































































GOP =RealGOP in 1978 in millions of international dollars, derived from data
for 1980 in United Nations and Commission of the European Communities
(1986) and extrapolated to 1982 and to countries not covered in the survey
by methods described in Kravis and Lipsey (1984).
GOPC =RealGOP per capita in 1978 international dollars
NORDIC: Coefficient -in millions of Kroner
Net Sales =Affiliatenet sales, derived as total affiliate sales minus imports
from Sweden (thousand Kroner)
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics— 32—
AppendixTable S-2








































































































































Paper Products 6,172 - .05 -.26 201 -- .435 .75
(66) (.82) (2.61) (.14) (7.9) (4.09)
Chemicals -122 -.51 -7.98 783 -- 3.511 .50
(66) (.00) (2.17) (.51) (3.7) (3.09)
Metal Mfg. —18,247 —.04 7.90 443 —- .500 .75
(66) (1.06) (.85) (1.97) (7.9) (4.34)
Non-Elect. Mach, -14,603 .22 17.02 850 -- .368 .91
(66) (.61) (3.60) (3.08) (11.5) (9.05)
Elect. Mach. -21,828 —.08 15.73 487 —- .516 .60
(66) (.87) (.78) (2.19) (6.2) (1.15)
Transp. Equip. —24,446 .76 .75 1,165 —- .921 .60
(66) (.41) (6.06) (.05) (5.7) (2.85)
Other Mfg. —6,108 —.06 7.60 772 -- 2.490 .50
(66) (.10) (.47) (.54) (4.2) (4.58)
For definitions, see notes to Appendix Table S—i— 34—
AppendixTable S-3
OLS Regression Results Separating Net Sales (NS) and Net Local Sales (NLS)


























































































































































Net local sales in thousands of Kroner— 35—
AppendixTable S-4
OLS Regression Results for the Determinants of Changes in































































































































































































For definitions of variables, see text— 37—
AppendixTable US-I
Equations for U.S. Exports to a Country as a Function of
Country Characteristics and of Net Sales in that Country
by Majority-Owned U.S. Affiliates, 1982












1 —3,586 .09 4.5 .01 .24 48
(0.3) (1.9) (2.1) (0.6)
2 -498 .02 .26 -.0 .56 47
(0.6) (4.4) (1.9) (0.0)
3 720 .03 1.8 —.04 .05 44
(0.1) (1.2) (1.6) (1.4)
4 -21,024 1.4 3.8 -.24 .77 48
(0.6) (11.7) (0.6) (4.3)
5 —3,176 .15 4.6 .15 .64 48
(0.4) (5.2) (3.0) (2.3)
6 NA
7 NA
8 2,583 -.04 .80 -.01 .20 48
(0.6) (2.8) (1.1) (0.6)
9 1,809 .03 .48 .31 .80 48
(0.5) (2.4) (0.8) (10.3)
10 -12,142 .44 1.6 -.08 .86 48
(1.8) (13.9) (1.4) (4.7)
11 -1,317 .03 1.0 .01 .47 48
(0.6) (2.3) (2.6) (0.9)
12 15,796 .08 —1.2 .26 .60 47
(4.0) (5.7) (1.7) (4.2)
13 12,058 1.5 .72 .02 .83 48
(0.4) (13.0) (0.1) (0.5)
14 1,296 .33 1.6 -.04 .83 48
(0.2) (12.3) (1.3) (1.1)
15 291 .04 1.4 .02 .60 48
(0.1) (4.4) (3.4) (1.6)
16 -1,802 .03 1.2 .06 .60 48



















—26,747 .54 3.5 —.31 .85 48
(2.7) (14.0) (2.0) (3.2)
2,038 .21 48 .18 7.7
(0.1) (1.9) (1.7) (0.4)
.02
NA
21 22,299 .07 6.5 .07 .14 48
(1.0) (0.8) (1.6) (0.1)
22 -19,834 .12 16.8 .28 .83 48
(0.6) (0.7) (3.0) (7.5)
23 6,151 .73 21.6 .18 .54 48
(0.1) (3.8) (2.4) (1.7)
24 -4,143 -.01 2.5 .03 .13 48
(0.7) (0.4) (2.5) (0.5)
25 2,524 .26 2.4 -.05 .56 48
(0.2) (6.5) (1.2) (0.4)
26 22,660 .05 2.0 .70 .61 48
(0.9) (0.5) (0.4) (6.3)
27 -19,825 .61 13.4 .03 .61 48
(0.7) (5.8) (2.8) (0.2)
28 -19,400 .03 19.4 .01 .14 48







-45,886 1.26 -.67 —3.75 .74 48
(1.5) (11.2) (0.1) (5.6)
NA
-1,907 .03 1.5 -.01 .37 48
(0.6)(3.0) (2.8) (0.4)
-44,303 .84 12.2 .16 .94 48
(2.8) (14.6) (4.4) (7.7)
-15,518 .12 6.0 .49 .54 48
(1.1) (2.1) (2.5) (2.5)— 39—
Notesto Appendix Table US—I.
Canada is excluded from the equations
GOP =RealGOP in 1982 in millions of international dollars (see notes to
Appendix Table S—i).
GOPC =RealGOP per capita in 1982.
Net Sales =Affiliatenet sales, derived as total affiliate sales minus
imports from the U.S.
Numbers in parentheses are t—statistics.
The 34 industries are the following:
1. Grain Mill and Bakery Products
2. Beverages
3. Tobacco
4. Other Food Products
5. Textiles and Apparel
6. Leather and Leatherware
7. Pulp and Paper
8. Paper Products
9. Printing and Publishing
10. Drugs






17. Primary Metals, Ferrous
18. Primary Metals, Nonferrous
19. Fabricated Metals
20. Farm and Garden Machinery
21. Construction and Related Machinery
22. Office and Computing Machinery
23. Other Non Electrical Machinery
24. Household Appliances
25. Radio, TV and Communication Equipment
26. Electronic Components
27. Other Electrical Machinery
28. Motor Vehicles and Equipment
29. Other Transport Equipment
30. Lumber, Wood, Furniture, and Fixtures
31. Glass Products
32. Stone, Clay, Cement, Concrete
33. Instruments and Related Products
34. Other IndustriesAppendix Table US-2
Equations for U.S. Exports to a Country as a Function of Country Characteristics
and of Production in that Country by Majority-Owned U.S. Affiliates, 1982





















A —54.6 1.80 5.98 —135.4 .87 23
(0.89) (11.16) (0.52) (4.26)
B 17.7 2.53 11.85 —60.90 .87 27
(0.21) (11.22) (0.83) (1.96)
C 7.9 .80 2.03 -6.99 .78 20
(0.15) (7.10) (0.26) (0.17)
D 66.8 .59 48.14 222.1 .64 26
(0.36) (0.46) (1.88) (1.80)
E 156.2 1.14 —9.50 155.6 .59 24
(1.31) (3.80) (0.48) (1.56)
F -81.1 .88 51.24 5.92 .52 24
(0.67) (2.82) (2.83) (0.22)
B 21.9 2.88 17.92 —202.2 .92 17
(0.20) (11.0) (0.88) (3.82)
0 20.0 .92 55.52 334.3 .63 24
(0.10) (0.52) (2.09) (1.13)
E 103.0 1.07 6.99 185.8 .61 18
(0.76) (3.09) (0.30) (1.10)
F -72.0 .92 48.35 19.15 .53 22
(0.56) (2.88) (2.54) (0.40)
B 110.2 3.11 —10.84 —255.3 125.3 .92 17
(0.94) (10.80) (0.41) (4.26) (1.56)
0 48.1 1.22 45.46 50.1 312.7 .62 24
(0.24) (0.68) (1.57) (0.12) (0.90)
E 44.9 1.32 4.64 —303.3 914.6 .73 18
(0.39) (4.34) (0.24) (1.32) (2.73)
F -75.0 .93 48.64 37.0 —27.6 .51 22
(0.57) (2.83) (2.49) (0.50) (0.32)
— 40—
Table US—i are: Industry Groups defined in terms of the industries of Appendix
A. Foods and Kindred Products (Nos. 1-4)
B. Chemicals and Allied Products (Nos. 10-14)
C. Metals (Nos. 17-19)
0. Non—electrical machinery (Nos. 20—23)
E. Electrical Machinery (Nos. 24-27)
F. Transport Equipment (Nos. 28 & 29)— 41—
AppendixTable US-3
Equatic- for Exports toa Louritly as a t-unction ot Country Characteristics
and of Production in that Country by both Majority-Owned andMinority-Owned
U.S. Affiliates, 1982




Aff 1 1 iate
Net Sales
(MONS)













A -58.6 1.75 8.05 -133.6 25.4
(0.91) (6.85)(0.64) (3.54) (0.20)
.86
B 100.0 1.02 3.04 15.5 417.0
(1.88) (3.82)(0.35) (0.70) (6.55) C -34.8 .75 5.17 2.7 66.4
(0.63) (5.37)(0.65) (0.07) (0.66)
.81
0 277.3 -.44 2.28 289.2 546.9
(2.41) (0.54)(0.13) (3.03) (1.37)
.85
E 149.0 .85-7.03 142.3 320.2
(1.28) (2.38)(0.36) (1.45) (1.40)
.61
F 34.9 .3618.53 50.0 43.8
(0.61) (1.26)(2.31) (3.00) (1.92)
B 18.7 1.4226.20 —74.9 335.9
(0.26) (3.79)(1.94) (1.66) (4.40) 0 224.0 —.3313.06 424.7 769.5
(1.65) (0.27)(0.68) (1.81) (1.70)
E 90.0 .85 9.65 142.0 289.6
(0.67) (2.16)(0.42) (0.83) (1.16) F 18.3 .73 16.17 65.0 18.1
(0.40) (3.23)(2.46) (3.04) (1.02)
108.3 1.64-2.93 -124.0 127.1 337.1
(1.68) (5.32)(0.20) (3.11) (2.90) (5.54)
268.3 .06-3.40 85.2 440.7 586.7
(2.11) (0.05)(0.17) (0.31) (2.03) (1.34)
-6.3 .95 9.25 —595.4 1,289.0 606.3
(0.07) (3.88)(0.64) (3.19) (4.81) (3.59)
23.1 .6716.03 59.2 15.5 22.6






















Equations for Exports to a Country by Countries other than the U.S.
as a Function of Country Characteristics and of Net Sales in that Country
by Majority-Owned U.S. Affiliates, 1982














1 —1,501 .08 13.64 .12 .48 48
(.1) (.9) (3.3) (3.4)
2 -67,692 .35 19.21 .56 .65 47
(2.0) (2.3) (3.3) (3.0)
3 -12,361 .16 5.84 .05 .27 44
(.6) (2.4) (1.7) (.5)
4 —524,864 6.11 127.38 1.57 .77 48
(1.9) (7.0) (2.6) (3.5)
5 -595,386 4.40 188.19 7.20 .62 48
(1.8) (4.1) (3.2) (2.9)
6 NA
7 NA
8 —35,804 .08 15.80 .25 .48 48
(1.7) (1.0) (4.4) (2.3)
9 -32,392 .10 19.49 .79 .57 48
(1.3) (1.1) (4.3) (3.5)
10 -28,181 .50 22.67 .15 .81 48
(1.2) (4.7) (5.7) (2.6)
11 -28,862 —.08 15.03 .22 .73 48
(2.2) (1.2) (6.5) (5.2)
12 —4,176 .36 10.22 .60 .32 47
(.1) (3.0) (1.7) (1.1)
13 —204,377 4.22 115.87 1.05 .66 48
(18) (4.7) (2.5) (3.4)
14 —42,332 .51 26.06 .62 .77 48
(1.3) (4.4) (4.7) (4.2)
15 -78,931 .30 30.73 .33 .55 48
(2.1) (2.2) (4.7) (2.1)
16 -33,130 —.12 15.26 1.79 .84 48
(1.9) (1.7) (4.8) (9.9)
17 NA
18 -189,789 2.65 52.63 4.31 .86 48
(2.2) (8.0) (3.4) (5.1)
19 —94,157 .01 84.50 .75 .69 48




-2 No. of No. mntercept GOP Capita Sales R Obs.
(GDPC) (NS)
20 NA
21 20,148 .08 3175 .44 .51 48
(.4) (.5) (3.9) (3.3) 22 -4,195 —.78 31.14 .58 .89 48
(.1) (4.2) (4.7) (13.12) 23 23,828 1.22 122.35 1.69 .72 48
(.2) (2.1) (4.5) (5.0) 24 —46,371 .07 24.80 2.00 .72 48
(1.6) (.7) (5.0) (6.2) 25 -106,328 1.06 64.86 .93 .45 48
(1.0) (3.0) (3.6) (.9) 26 -36,407 .08 18.52 1.27 .80 48
(1.1) (.6) (3.2) (9.0) 27 —103,211 .92 79.26 1.25 .63 48
(1.1) (2.8) (5.0) (2.5) 28 -334,881 1.72 237.42 .41 .56 48
(1.0) (1.4) (4.1) (3.6) 29 NA
30 -286,367 3.29 69.63 .61 .85 48
(3.5) (10.9) (4.9) (.3) 31 NA
32 -42,197 —.02 33.65 2.20 .56 48
(.8) (.1) (3.8) (4.1) 33 —100,277 .84 64.71 .75 .77 48
(1.2) (2.8) (4.4) (6.7) 34 -182,887 .02 88.65 6.03 .56 48
(1.5) (0.0) (4.2) (3.4)
For definitions and industry list,see notes to Appendix Table US-I.
Numbers in parentheses are t-statjstjcs. -- 44—
AppendixTable US-5
Equations for Exports by Countries Other than the U.S. to a Country as a Function of
Country Characteristics and of Production in that Country by both
Majority-Owned and Minority-Owned U.S. Affiliates, 1982



















A —1,289 8.96353.7 584.8 -2,194 .80 22
(2.14) (3.76) (3.0) (1.66) (1.85)
B —1,055 11.75511.5 254.6 —2,446 .87 27
(2.41) (5.33) (2.80) (3.54) (4.65)
C —810.4 5.20323.3 2,278.8 —2,252 .81 18
(1.07) (2.70) (2.98) (4.14) (1.63)
0 52.4 2.68181.4 592.6 1,152 .88 24
(0.14) (1.06) (3.33) (1.97) (0.92)
E —255.1 —.08151.7 2,042.7 -158 .80 24
(0.70) (0.07) (2.52) (6.72) (0.22)
F -547.7 7.59215.7 511.8 -641 .85 19
(0.92) (2.51) (2.57) (2.94) (2.69)
B —2,034 11.27615.4 170.9 —2,627 .89 17
(3.27) (3.45) (5.22) (0.43) (3.95)
0 -201.3 5.93211.6 148.8 2,282 .86 22
(0.48) (1.58) (3.50) (0.20) (1.61)
E —208.5 -.57215.1 3,160.4 -843 .78 18
(0.44) (0.41) (2.62) (5.20) (0.95)
F —398.0 13.13139.2 591.4 —1,030 .99 17
(2.59) (17.1) (6.26) (8.16) (17.19)
B —1,230.5 13.26353.8 —270.2 1,140.9—2,616 .93 17
(2.22) (5.02) (2.81) (0.79) (3.04)(5.03)
0 35.0 7.97123.6 —1,665.3 2,355.21,304 .94 22
(0.12) (3.11) (2.77) (2.67) (4.76)(1.34)
E —463.1 —.29214.0 1,211.2 3,407.5 -.6 .89 18
(1.14) (0.25) (3.13) (1.37) (2.69)(0.01)
F —393.2 13.07139.1 585.7 15.4—1,025 .99 17
(2.41) (14.75) (6.01) (7.00) (0.16)(15.0)
For notes, see Appendix Table US-2.